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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 20, 2014, National Public Radio (“NPR”) reported a
record high number of American citizens renouncing their
citizenship worldwide. 1 In 2012, 932 individuals renounced their
1.

See Ari Shapiro, Why More Americans are Renouncing U.S. Citizenship,
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U.S. citizenship or terminated their U.S. residency (termed
“expatriating”). 2 In 2013 this number surged to 2,999, the highest
number in history, and almost thirteen times the number of
expatriates only five years earlier. 3 Even more are expected to
renounce their citizenship in 2014 and 2015 due to the newly
implemented law. 4 The NPR article reported, “[w]hile individual
reasons for renouncing may vary from person to person, experts in
the field say the recent dramatic spike has more to do with the 2010
tax law [the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act] than any other
factor.” 5
In 2010, Congress passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (“FATCA”), 6 which requires all foreign financial institutions
(“FFIs”) doing business with the United States to collect information
about their U.S. accountholders and disclose that information to the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 7 If an FFI does not fully comply
NPR (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/02/20/275937138/
why-more-americans-are-renouncing-u-s-citizenship (attributing the thirty percent
increase from 2012 to 2013 to changes in international tax law).
2. See Andrew Mitchel & Ryan E. Dunn, 2013 Expatriations Increase by
221%, INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014), http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/
2014/02/2013-expatriations-increase-by-___.html (highlighting that between 1998
and 2009, the number of American expatriates maintained a gradual incline from
398 to 742, but dramatically increased after the passage of the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act in 2009).
3. See Shapiro, supra note 1 (describing the recent increase of expatriates as a
“sudden spike”); Mitchel & Dunn, supra note 2 (explaining the increase of
expatriates from 1998 to 2013 as a symptom of changes in tax law); see also
Quarterly Publication of Individuals Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, 79 Fed. Reg.
7504 (Feb. 7, 2014) (providing a quarterly notice of individuals who expatriate).
4. See Alex Newman, Amid IRS Abuse, Record Number of Americans Give
Up U.S. Citizenship, NEW AM. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/us
news/congress/item/17134-amid-irs-abuse-record-number-of-americans-give-up-us-citizenship (stating that recent tax reforms will make expatriation more attractive
to U.S. citizens).
5. Shapiro, supra note 1.
6. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, H.R. 2847, 111th Cong. §
501 (2010). Congress passed FATCA legislation in a large legislative package
directed at job creation. The provisions implementing FATCA are contained in
sections 1471 through 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code. For more details about
FATCA’s provisions, see sources cited infra note 7.
7. See generally Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-TaxCompliance-Act-FATCA (last updated Jan. 13, 2015) [hereinafter FATCA History]
(providing brief background information about FATCA); Resource Center:
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with FATCA’s requirements, including the requirement to identify
all U.S.-held accounts, the act imposes a thirty percent withholding
on U.S. payments passing through the institution. 8
Unsurprisingly, the reaction to FATCA from the international
community has included opposition, as many claim the U.S. tax law
is an overreaching and onerous breach of privacy and foreign
sovereignty. 9 In response to public comments on FATCA, and the
realization that FFIs would attempt to avoid FATCA by refusing to
serve U.S. clientele abroad, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
published a Model FATCA Agreement (“U.S. Model”) 10 that
includes an addendum with an anti-discrimination provision
explicitly prohibiting FFIs from discriminating against U.S.
persons. 11 Currently, the United States has FATCA agreements
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx
(last updated Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Resource Center: FATCA] (providing
detailed information about FATCA, including press releases and model
intergovernmental agreements).
8. See FATCA History, supra note 7 (“U.S. financial institutions and other
U.S withholding agents must both withhold 30% on certain payments to foreign
entities that do not document their FATCA status and report information about
certain non-financial foreign entities.”).
9. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Analysis: Critics Say New Law Makes Them
Tax Agents, REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/
us-usa-tax-fatca-idUSTRE77I38220110819 (quoting an American senior finance
executive in Hong Kong as stating FATCA is “America’s most imperialist act
since it invaded the Philippine Islands in 1899”); id. (noting that backlash from
numerous foreign banks led to the U.S. Department of the Treasury delaying the
implementation date of FATCA).
10. See Treasury Releases Model Intergovernmental Agreement for
Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to Improve Offshore Tax
Compliance and Reduce Burden, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (July 26, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1653.aspx [hereinafter
Treasury Releases Model] (announcing the release of the first two versions of the
U.S. Model developed in conjunction with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom); see also Resource Center: FATCA, supra note 7 (explaining
that the U.S. Department of the Treasury currently has multiple versions of the
model agreement, one for agreements reached before the enactment of FATCA and
one for agreements reached after the enactment).
11. See, e.g., Model 1 IGA Annex II, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCAAnnex-II-to-Model-1-Agreement-11-4-13.pdf [hereinafter Annex II] (“The
Financial Institution must not have policies or practices that discriminate against
opening or maintaining Financial Accounts for individuals who are Specified U.S.
Persons and residents of [Canada].”).
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signed and in effect with fifty-six jurisdictions; 12 of these, all except
Canada’s contain the U.S. Model anti-discrimination provision in the
final FATCA agreement. 13 The U.S.-Canada Income Tax Convention
(“ITC”), 14 which memorializes the FATCA agreement between the
United States and Canada, not only omits the anti-discrimination
clause, but provides no other similar protections for U.S. persons
within the ITC.
As predicted, since the passage of Canada’s FATCA, Americans
in Canada have repeatedly complained of being shut out from doing
business in Canadian financial institutions 15—exactly what the antidiscrimination clause in the U.S. Model would have served to
prevent. The inability of these individuals to access such basic
financial services limits their ability to, among many other
limitations, efficiently manage finances with checking and savings
accounts, pay bills or rent online or with debit and credit cards, tax
plan, job hunt, or apply for certain tax credits. 16
Given the sweeping changes that FATCA brings to the
international tax information exchange arena, and because
discrimination on the basis of U.S. national origin is one of the
anticipated consequences of FATCA, should Canada be precluded
from omitting the U.S. Model’s anti-discrimination clause from its
tax treaty? This Comment analyzes whether Canada’s FATCA,
which omits the U.S. Model’s anti-discrimination clause, is a
violation of Canada’s obligations under the International Covenant
12. See Resource Center: FATCA-Archive, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCAArchive.aspx (last updated Jan. 8, 2015) (listing another fifty-six jurisdictions that
signed FATCA agreements, but have not reached an agreement in substance like
the fifty-six jurisdictions mentioned above).
13. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Canada to Improve International Tax Compliance Through
Enhanced Exchange of Information under the Convention Between the United
States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
U.S.-Can., Feb. 5, 2014, T.I.A.S. 14-627 [hereinafter U.S.-Can. FATCA
Agreement].
14. Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., Sept. 26, 1980, 1469
U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter Income Tax Convention]; see U.S.-Can. FATCA
Agreement, supra note 13.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
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on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 17 a multilateral human
rights treaty that guarantees individuals freedom from discrimination
on the grounds of, among other protected classes, national origin. 18
This Comment argues that Canada’s FATCA, absent an antidiscrimination clause, violates the ICCPR.
Part II of the Comment presents a background of the international
tax compliance framework, discusses relevant case law that led to the
passage of the U.S. FATCA in 2010, and highlights key provisions
of the law. Part III analyzes Canada’s recently passed FATCA
agreement (“Canada’s FATCA”), 19 which omits the antidiscrimination clause of the U.S. Model. This Part argues that the
omission of the anti-discrimination clause is a violation of
international law, vis-à-vis its incongruity with the antidiscriminatory purpose of the ICCPR. 20 Part III also asserts that,
pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna
Convention”), 21 the Supreme Court of Canada should find the antidiscrimination clause in the U.S. Model persuasive to its
interpretation of FATCA.
Part IV recommends that (1) Canada amend its FATCA to include
the U.S. Model’s anti-discrimination clause; (2) the United States
should subsidize the cost of FATCA’s implementation in Canada to
prevent discrimination against U.S. persons in Canada; or (3) the
United Nations’ Human Rights Committee should find that Canada’s
FATCA, absent anti-discrimination protections, violates the
ICCPR. 22 Finally, the Comment concludes that Canada’s FATCA, as
it is currently set forth, violates the ICCPR because it does not
effectively guarantee protection from discrimination. 23

17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1979) [hereinafter ICCPR].
18. See id. arts. 2(2), 26 (“[T]he law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as . . . national . . . origin.”).
19. An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.).
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 15, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
23. See discussion infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
Unique amongst developed countries, the United States taxes its
citizens on worldwide income. 24 This means that no matter where a
U.S. citizen or resident lives, or where the income is earned, he or
she must file annual income tax returns and pay associated taxes. 25

A. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES’
PERSPECTIVE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Because the United States collects federal income tax primarily
through “voluntary compliance,” a process where a taxpayer or entity
assesses and self-reports its own tax liability, and makes the
appropriate tax payments to cover the liability, the IRS continuously
combats underreporting of tax liability, non-filing of tax returns, and
underpayment of taxes. 26 In combatting these problems, one
successful method of enforcement for the IRS is to require
withholding of estimated taxes. 27 This occurs when the payor of
taxable income, such as an employer, is required to withhold a
portion of a taxable payment (such as withholding a percentage of
wages from an employee) and submits the payment to the IRS for
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2014) (defining income to include “all income from
whatever source derived”); see also Don Whiteley, Canada Capitulates on FATCA
Agreement, BC BUS. (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bcbusiness.ca/finance/canadacapitulates-on-fatca-agreement (“The U.S. is one of only two countries in the
world (the other is Eritrea) that levies income tax based on citizenship rather than
residence.”).
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 911 (governing the filing of income tax for citizens and
residents of the United States living abroad); id. § 6012 (requiring “[e]very
individual having for the taxable year gross income” to file income tax returns).
See generally Information for U.S. Citizens or Dual Citizens Residing Outside the
U.S., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Informationfor-U.S.-Citizens-or-Dual-Citizens-Residing-Outside-the-U.S. (last updated Feb.
12, 2014) (providing general tax filing information and instructions for U.S.
citizens who live outside the United States, including the requirement that all U.S.
citizens must file “federal income tax return[s] for any tax year in which [their]
gross incomes [are] equal to or greater than the applicable exemption amount and
standard deduction”).
26. See generally Mark R. Van Heukelom, Note, The Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to Comply than To Opt
Out, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 155, 158 (2013) (providing an overview of income tax
collection through voluntary compliance).
27. Id. (citing Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the United States
and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 323 (2011)).
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application towards the employee’s tax obligation. 28 At the end of the
taxable year, if the withholding paid to the IRS equals the taxpayer’s
obligation, the IRS has fully collected the liability. 29 Indeed, the IRS
states that when income is reported dually to both the IRS and the
taxpayer (such as wages in the previous example), the income has a
ninety-nine percent likelihood of being reported on the taxpayer’s
return. 30
On the other hand, in cases where dual reporting is not required,
this percentage drops to just forty-four percent. 31 Consequently, in
the realm of international taxation—where withholding has rarely
been practical due to differing tax assessments and requirements
around the world—U.S. tax compliance and effective tax
enforcement issues are much more complex. 32
1. Voluntary Compliance Measures
The IRS has recognized that U.S. taxpayers with international
income sources or dual citizenship might not file their U.S. income
taxes properly, intentionally or not. 33 In addition, differing local laws
governing bank secrecy and information privacy have made it
difficult for the IRS to reliably determine the accuracy of a tax
filing. 34 As a result, both the taxpayer and the IRS have been at the
mercy of various voluntary compliance procedures to help ensure
proper filing.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Karl Kuepper, Oliver von Schweinitz & Mark Orlic, How FATCA Will
Impact Financial Services in Germany, INT’L TAX REV. (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3130149/How-FATCA-willimpact-financial-services-in-Germany.html.
31. See id. (remarking that an example where dual reporting is not required is
capital gains earned in overseas accounts).
32. See Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 158 (noting that voluntary
compliance is less effective internationally than domestically) (citing Melissa A.
Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2972
(2011)).
33. See Information for U.S. Citizens or Dual Citizens Residing Outside the
U.S., supra note 25 (recognizing that some taxpayers who are dual citizens of the
United States and a foreign country may fail to timely file).
34. See Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 157-58 (stating that differences in
national laws can create conditions for tax fraud across borders).
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The IRS implemented two primary methods of voluntary
compliance in international taxation. The first is the U.S. taxpayer’s
disclosure of foreign bank accounts in a Report of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts (“FBAR”), submitted annually to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury. 35 The FBAR requires the taxpayer to
report information about foreign financial accounts exceeding
$10,000, or face fines and penalties. 36 However, because the FBAR
is a method of self-reporting, it has not been particularly effective in
curtailing taxpayer noncompliance. 37
Thus, in 2000 the IRS implemented a second method of voluntary
disclosure known as the Qualified Intermediary (“QI”) program. 38 In
the QI program, participating FFIs volunteer to “‘withhold and
report’ tax on subjected income in exchange for certain benefits”
from the IRS. 39 Critics of the QI program have pointed out that
although “this scheme induced foreign banks to cooperate with the
IRS, the complicated and often indirect nature of international
financial transactions limited the scheme’s effectiveness.” 40
2. The Swiss Bank Scandal
Given the tame nature of these voluntary approaches, some argued
that, until recently, the United States did not take international tax
evasion seriously. 41 The increasing gap between the taxes owed to
35. See generally New Legislation Could Affect Filers of the Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts, but Potential Issues are Being Addressed, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/
2010reports/201030125fr.html (providing an overview of the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970 and the IRS’s subsequent creation of the Form FBAR to assist taxpayers in
complying with the Bank Secrecy Act).
36. Id.; see Mitchel & Dunn, supra note 2 (explaining that the standard penalty
for unintentional failure to file the FBAR is $10,000 per Form per year; the penalty
for willful failure to file is the greater of $100,000 or fifty percent of the account
balance at the time of the violation).
37. See Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 158.
38. See generally Qualified Intermediary Frequently Asked Questions,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/InternationalBusinesses/Qualified-Intermediary-Frequently-Asked-Questions (last updated Jan.
27, 2015) (providing an overview of the Qualified Intermediary program).
39. Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 158.
40. Id. (noting that the drawback of the QI program is that most foreign
income subject to U.S. taxation passes through U.S. withholding agents, rather
than Qualified Intermediaries).
41. See Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing
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the IRS on international transactions and the taxes actually collected
each year from these sources, 42 compounded by the need to raise
revenue during the 2008 American economic crisis, have prompted
drastic change in U.S. tax collection efforts. 43
In 2009, former banker Bradley Birkenfeld of UBS bank, a bank
participating in the IRS’s voluntary QI program in Switzerland,
turned tax evasion into worldwide news when he blew the whistle on
his bank’s scheme to defraud the IRS. 44 In United States v. UBS

Continue?, TAX ANALYSTS 1, 3 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.taxanalysts.com
/www/features.nsf/Articles/0C26B2CFD92F1FBE85257AFC004E8B38?OpenDoc
ument (highlighting that tax evasion was not taken seriously before the 2009 Swiss
Bank case discussed infra Part II).
42. Compare 156 CONG. REC. S1635-36 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010) (statement
of Sen. Levin) (estimating that tax-dodging schemes cost the Federal Treasury
$100 billion a year), with Frederic Behrens, Comment, Using a Sledgehammer to
Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, WIS. L. REV. 205, 207 (2013)
(estimating that offshore personal income tax evasion results in $40-70 billion in
revenue lost yearly), and Kuepper, supra note 30 (“The gross tax gap has
grown . . . since [the IRS’s] previous estimate for tax year 2001, increasing from
$345 billion to $450 billion for tax year 2006.”). The deficit varies depending on
the measure used (e.g., annual, gross, and net losses).
43. See Shapiro, supra note 1 (commenting that the economic recession
coupled with the UBS Swiss Bank scandal gave lawmakers a chance to “bring in
massive sums of money and stop tax cheats at the same time”); see, e.g.,
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 353 (2005) (rejecting the longstanding “revenue rule,” which prohibited enforcement of foreign tax laws in
domestic courts, thereby allowing the prosecution of Americans who violated
Canadian tax law in U.S. courts).
44. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Wealthy Americans Under Scrutiny in UBS
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/business/
worldbusiness/06tax.html?_r=1& (providing background information on Mr.
Birkenfeld); Miles Costello, US Claims UBS ‘Colluded’ Behind Secrecy Laws,
TIMES ONLINE (July 18, 2008), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/
banking/article2157858.ece; Carlyn Kolker, Union Charter’s Birkenfeld Resigns
After
Arrest
in
Tax
Scheme,
BLOOMBERG
(June
4,
2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akUn9kowF0Vk
(shedding light on the indictment against Mr. Birkenfeld who helped Igor
Olenicoff hide $200 million of assets in foreign countries); Evan Perez, Offshore
Tax Evasion Costs U.S. $100 Billion, Senate Probe of UBS, LGT Indicates, WALL
ST. J. (July 17, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121624391105859731;
Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577
645412614237708. Other tax evasion scandals unfolded during the same time
period, however the UBS case appeared to attract the most attention in the United
States.
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AG, 45 the U.S. government sued Switzerland’s largest bank to try to
force disclosure of the identities of approximately 52,000 American
customers who allegedly hid their secret Swiss accounts from U.S.
tax authorities. 46 According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Complaint, U.S. customers failed to report and pay taxes on income
earned from accounts that held about $14.8 billion in assets. 47 Acting
Assistant Attorney General for the Department’s Tax Division, John
A. DiCicco, commented that “[a]t a time when millions of
Americans are losing their jobs, their homes and their health care, it
is appalling that more than 50,000 of the wealthiest among us have
actively sought to evade their civic and legal duty to pay taxes.” 48
Under threat of criminal proceedings, UBS paid $780 million in fines
to the IRS and turned over the names of more than 4,000 U.S.
taxpayers who had maintained Swiss bank accounts. 49
UBS Bank, previously a QI, demonstrated the weakness of the
voluntary compliance system. 50 The Swiss Bank case sparked debate
about U.S. efforts in ensuring tax compliance overseas and propelled

45. No. 09-60033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66739 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).
46. See id. at *2 (seeking to compel UBS to disclose records of the “John Doe”
class of U.S. taxpayers); Peter Nelson, Note, Conflicts of Interest: Resolving Legal
Barriers to the Implementation of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 32
VA. TAX REV. 387, 391 (2012) (noting that UBS misled U.S. authorities by hiding
the true residency status of their U.S. accountholders and thereby allowed them to
escape U.S. taxation).
47. United States Asks Court to Enforce Summons for UBS Swiss Bank
Account Records, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/united-states-asks-court-enforce-summons-ubs-swiss-bank-account-records.
48. Id.
49. See Excerpts from IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman’s Press Remarks on
UBS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/
Excerpts-from-IRS-Commissioner-Doug-Shulman%27s-Press-Remarks-on-UBS
(explaining that this action sends the message to all U.S. taxpayers that their efforts
to hide assets will fail); IRS to Receive Unprecedented Amount of Information in
UBS Agreement, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/IRS-to-Receive-Unprecedented-Amount-of-Information-in-UBS-Agreement
(stating that UBS turned over all requested information); UBS Enters Into Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-enters-deferred-prosecution-agreement
(announcing that UBS Bank admitted to helping U.S. taxpayers hide accounts from
the IRS, and that the bank agreed to identify those customers, and pay $780 million
in fines, penalties, interest, and restitution).
50. See Sheppard, supra note 41, at 5 (stating that there is no requirement that
banks “rat out U.S. customers hiding behind foreign entities”).
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Congress to change its approach towards tax havens and shelters. 51
Thus began the enactment of an international tax compliance scheme
that shifts from voluntary to mandatory compliance.

B. THE SHIFT TO MANDATORY COMPLIANCE: THE UNITED
STATES PASSES FATCA
In the wake of the Swiss Bank scandal, Congress passed FATCA
as part of the 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act. 52
The law aims to “advance U.S. tax collection and enforcement
efforts abroad and recoup the estimated hundreds of billions of
dollars lost each year due to tax evasion.” 53 The primary reason
FATCA departs so drastically from previous methods of foreign
asset disclosure, such as the FBAR and QI program, is that for
noncompliant FFIs, FATCA imposes a mandatory thirty percent
withholding of payments passing from U.S. payors to the
institution.54
In brief, FATCA requires that any FFI 55 that intends to invest in a
U.S. asset (whether for itself or a client): sign a contract with the IRS
in which it promises to review existing accounts to identify all U.S.
persons; 56 implement procedures to monitor new accounts for the
51. See ERIKA K. LUNDER & CAROL A. PETTIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43444, REPORTING FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSETS UNDER TITLES 26 AND 31:
FATCA AND FBAR 6 (2014) (commenting that the shortcomings of the voluntary
compliance programs, along with the UBS case, influenced Congress to enact
more stringent reporting requirements, such as those presented in FATCA).
52. H.R. 2847, 111th Cong. § 501 (2010).
53. Id.
54. See Behrens, supra note 42, at 209 (stating an unintended consequence is
that “FFIs facing heavy compliance costs might determine that it is easier to drop
American clients and investments than to comply with FATCA.”). The
withholding threatens a substantial source of revenue for financial institutions
involved with U.S. payors.
55. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(5) (2010) (defining “financial institutions” as any
foreign entity that collects deposits in the fashion of a bank; maintains financial
assets for others as a substantial portion of its business; or is primarily in the
business of investing in a wide range of securities or other interests); see also
FATCA Information for Foreign Financial Institutions and Entities, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Information-forForeign-Financial-Institutions (last updated July 11, 2014) (detailing the
requirements that FACTA places on foreign banks).
56. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. 765 (May 9, 2011) (defining
“U.S. person” as an individual or entity with any of these U.S. indicia: U.S.
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same purpose; agree to provide the IRS with annual information
about these accounts; 57 and agree to deduct and withhold a thirty
percent tax for any accountholders that will not comply. 58 If a
financial institution is deemed noncompliant in these requirements,
then U.S. payors must withhold thirty percent of the gross payments
made to U.S. accountholders. 59
1. Canada’s Reaction to FATCA
Not surprisingly, the international community—especially FFIs
and those who would experience the trickledown effect of harm
caused to those institutions —reacted with outrage over FATCA. 60
FATCA’s incongruity with other foreign privacy, bank secrecy,
access to banking, and discrimination laws is a top concern for
Canadian financial institutions and bankers. 61 Banks were
particularly worried they would be compelled to collect and disclose
information about U.S. customers, only to be sued by those
citizenship or lawful permanent resident (green card) status; a U.S. birthplace; a
U.S. residence address or a U.S. correspondence address (including a U.S. P.O.
box); standing instructions to transfer funds to an account maintained in the United
States, or directions regularly received from a U.S. address; an “in care of” address
or a “hold mail” address that is the sole address with respect to the client; or a
power of attorney or signatory authority granted to a person with a U.S. address).
57. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(c)(1) (information about U.S. accountholders
disclosed to the IRS includes the accountholder’s name, address, tax identification
number, account numbers and balances, and gross receipts and withdrawals for
each account).
58. See id. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i) (applying the tax to all passthru payments).
59. See Behrens, supra note 42, at 214 (calling it a “penalty for failure to
report tax obligations.”); IRS and Treasury Department Propose “Phase-In” of
FACTA Requirements, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 2 (July 15, 2011),
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_FATCA_Postpon
ed_Deadlines.pdf (characterizing the payments as “withholdable payments”). In
addition, if any foreign laws prohibit disclosure of the information because of
conflict of local law rules, the financial institution must submit a waiver. I.R.C. §
1472.
60. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 9 (noting Australia, Switzerland, Hong
Kong, the European Banking Federation, and the Institute of International
Bankers’ discontent with FATCA).
61. See Canada and U.S. Reach Agreement on Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act, DEP’T OF FIN. CAN. (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.fin.gc.ca/n14/14018-eng.asp [hereinafter Canada and U.S. Reach Agreement] (describing concerns
of the Canadian banking community as including conflict of laws issues, such as
the Canadian Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations and the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and FACTA).
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customers for privacy, due diligence, and discrimination claims. 62
Local Canadian laws, such as the Access to Basic Banking Services
Regulations (“ABBS”), 63 which prohibits banks from requiring
identification more than those enumerated in the law (none of which
includes the identification sources that FATCA requires institutions
to collect), 64 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom
(“Canadian Charter”), which prohibits discrimination, 65 could be
violated in the financial institution’s pursuit of identifying U.S.
persons within the meaning of FATCA. 66
Debates during the passage of the Canadian legislation
implementing FATCA illuminated Canadians’ disdain for the law
and the feeling that the United States was overreaching in its
approach to international tax compliance. 67 For example, U.S.-born

62. See id. (commenting on the fear from Canadian financial institutions of
being forced to disclose information regarding U.S. taxpayers); see also Letter
from Peter van Dijk, Senior Vice President of Taxation, TD Bank Fin. Grp., to the
Honorable Michael Mundaca, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Treasury, and the
Honorable Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 4, 2011)
(voicing concern from TD Bank Financial Group); Patrick Cain, Dual Citizens Sue
Feds Over FATCA Tax Deal with U.S., GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://globalnews.ca/news/1504452/dual-citizens-sue-feds-over-fatca-deal-lettingbanks-pass-info-to-irs [hereinafter Cain, Dual Citizens] (discussing a lawsuit based
on U.S. constitutional grounds filed by Canadian-U.S. dual citizens regarding the
FATCA deal).
63. Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.).
64. See id. (allowing for only one source of photo identification).
65. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter
Canadian Charter] (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”). The US-Canada
legislation implementing FATCA requires information-gathering and disclosure
procedures that effectively treat individuals differently and adversely based on an
immutable personal characteristic, citizenship—whether or not acknowledged or
desired by the individual.
66. See, e.g., Letter from Peter van Dijk to Michael Mundaca & Douglas
Shulman, supra note 62 (suggesting FATCA alternatives to the IRS
Commissioner).
67. See, e.g., 147 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2014) 071 (Can.) (“[T]he U.S.
has no right to impose sanctions on Canadian banks. It says it does. We should
challenge it in international court.”).
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Canadian Parliament member Elizabeth May stated during the
parliamentary debate:
It is clear that FATCA is advantageous for the United States alone. There
is nothing in it to help Canadians. As the lawyers and legal experts
explained, the only reason why the Government of Canada accepted this
agreement, which will violate the rights of Canadians, is that the U.S.
government threatened to impose sanctions on our banks. 68

2. The U.S. Model Anti-Discrimination Clause
From 2010 through 2012, in an attempt to help clarify and
implement FATCA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the
IRS published a series of preliminary notices and proposed
regulations. 69 Based on the public comments received, in January
2013, the IRS issued final regulations for FATCA, asserting that
bilateral intergovernmental agreements would facilitate the exchange
of tax compliance information. 70 The U.S. Department of Treasury
published the U.S. Model that would serve as a starting point for
bilateral negotiations between the United States and FATCA partner
countries. 71
The U.S. Model allows FFIs to be “deemed compliant,” and
therefore not subject to the thirty percent withholding, so long as
they meet certain conditions. 72 In addition, the agreement allows the
home country of an FFI to take responsibility for collecting the
information disclosures (as opposed to requiring the foreign financial
institution to report directly to the IRS), thereby relieving the

68. Id.
69. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124 (Aug. 8, 2011) (discussing
withholding, documentation, and reporting requirements); I.R.S. Notice 2011-34,
2011-19 I.R.B. 765 (May 9, 2011) (explaining the reporting requirements imposed
on FFIs); I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (Sept. 13, 2010) (notifying
stakeholders of important FATCA implementation information).
70. See T.D. 9610, 2013-15 I.R.B. 766 (referencing the joint view of Treasury
and the IRS).
71. Treasury Releases Model, supra note 10.
72. Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations to Combat Offshore Tax
Evasion, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg1825.aspx (clarifying and verifying obligations of
FFIs).
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institution of liability for disclosing information in violation of
privacy laws. 73
Moreover, as the Treasury Regulation notes, “[t]he final
regulations also add as a condition . . . that ‘the FFI not have policies
or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining
accounts for U.S. individuals that are resident in the local FFI’s
country.’” 74 Among the agreement’s many complex and technical
requirements, this anti-discrimination clause is the only provision
that directly and expressly defends against the discrimination that
U.S. persons abroad would soon face as a result of FATCA’s
implementation.
3. The U.S.-Canada Income Tax Convention Implementing FATCA
FATCA is not the first agreement of its kind for the United States
or Canada. Before FATCA, the United States had bilateral income
tax conventions (“ITCs”) with sixty-five countries. 75 These ITCs are
largely based on model language from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). 76 Canada has
an even larger network of preexisting bilateral tax treaties,
amounting to approximately ninety-two. 77 These tax treaties
generally allow the taxes of residents of one treaty country to be
reduced from taxes of the other treaty country to prevent double

73. See id. In reference to the potential for FATCA to violate Canadian
privacy laws, Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty stated, “Canada engaged in
lengthy negotiations with the U.S. government to address our concerns and, as a
result, significant exemptions and other relief were obtained.” Canada and U.S.
Reach Agreement, supra note 61. Accounts that will not be reportable under
FATCA include: Registered Retirement Savings Plans, Retirement Income Funds,
Disability Savings Plans, and Tax-Free Savings Accounts. In addition, small
deposit-taking institutions, such as credit unions, with assets of less than $175
million will be exempt. Id.
74. 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, 5890 (Jan. 28, 2013).
75. Charles Gustafson, The USA, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN
MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 1149 (Michael Lang et al.
eds., 2012).
76. MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (Org. Econ CoOperation & Dev. July 22, 2010).
77. See Catherine Brown & Martha O’Brien, Canada, in THE IMPACT OF THE
OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 203, n.1
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 2012) (explaining that Canada is an open economy
dependent on trade, with a large network of bilateral tax treaties).
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taxation of the same income. 78 Furthermore, to safeguard against tax
evasion, the ITCs typically provide for the exchange of tax
information between governments upon request when related to
specific criminal or civil tax matters that are under investigation. 79
The United States’ ITCs are based on the U.S. Model Income Tax
Convention, but vary from country to country. 80 The United States
and Canada signed their ITC, named the Convention with Respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital, in 1980. 81 To implement FATCA,
in 2014 the United States and Canada signed an intergovernmental
agreement, and the Canadian Parliament passed the agreement as law
under the existing U.S.-Canada ITC 82 as an agreement to “Improve
International Tax Compliance through Enhanced Exchange of
Information.” 83

C. TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION
When interpreting treaty provisions, it is common to refer to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 84 Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention states that treaties are to be “interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose.” 85 In addition to the treaty text, the Vienna Convention
78. See JONATHAN SCHWARZ, SCHWARZ ON TAX TREATIES 21 (3d ed. 2013)
(“[A]lmost all tax treaties were bilateral and principally aimed at preventing
double taxation.”).
79. See id. (allowing for mutual benefits via information sharing).
80. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K.,
Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668 (resembling the OECD Model Convention); see
also Gustafson, supra note 75, at 1150 (noting that the U.S. Treasury has declined
to embrace the OECD Model for its basic treaty negotiating position).
81. Income Tax Convention, supra note 14.
82. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Canada to Improve International Tax Compliance Through
Enhanced Exchange of Information Under the Convention Between the United
States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
U.S.-Can., Feb. 5, 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 14-627.
83. See An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.).
84. See Gustafson, supra note 75, at 1150 (stating that the Vienna Convention
often “represents the ‘best evidence’ of customary international law with respect to
treaty interpretation and administration”).
85. See Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 31(1) (instructing that the
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explains that the “context” includes “[a]ny instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the treaty.” 86
Canadian courts have repeatedly held that this interpretation is the
primary rule for interpreting its tax treaty with the United States. For
example, in TD Sec. (USA) LLC v. R, 87 the Tax Court of Canada
interpreted whether the Canada-U.S. ITC provided Canadian
residency status (and therefore certain treaty benefits) to a U.S.based bank with a branch office in Canada. 88 The court referred to
not only the ITC’s text, but OECD Model documents and the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Technical Explanation of the treaty to
aid its interpretation. 89 The Tax Court concluded that the surrounding
documents provided persuasive instruction on the ITC’s intent and
ultimately applied treaty benefits to the bank. 90 The decision
illustrated the court’s practical approach in interpreting and applying
ITC provisions. 91

D. CANADA’S ACCESSION TO THE ICCPR
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the ICCPR, a core
international human rights treaty, on December 16, 1966. 92 The
Canadian government acceded to the ICCPR in May 1976 and
thereupon became bound to its terms. 93
Pursuant to articles 2(2) and 26 of the ICCPR, Canada agreed to
respect human rights and ensure their application without
primary source for treaty interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the text of the
treaty itself).
86. Id. art. 31(2)(b).
87. [2010] 5 C.T.C. 2426 (Can.).
88. Id. ¶ 50.
89. Id. ¶ 61.
90. Id. ¶ 97.
91. See also Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 802 (Can.)
(exemplifying the cases before the Supreme Court of Canada that are interpreting
this world).
92. ICCPR, supra note 17.
93. See Privy Council Decision no. 1976-1156, May 18, 1976. The ICCPR
entered into force formally in Canada in August 1976. Canada acceded to the
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, as well.
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discrimination to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction. 94 Specifically, Canada vowed, “[w]here not already
provided for by existing legislative or other measures,” it would
“take the necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” 95
Article 26 of the ICCPR expressly guarantees all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. 96

Upon accession to the treaty, Canada committed itself to ensure
that any individual whose ICCPR rights were violated would receive
an effective remedy under national law. 97 Thus far, Canada has
declared that it still stands by that 1976 commitment. 98

III. ANALYSIS
The omission of the anti-discrimination clause in Canada’s
FATCA is in direct conflict with the ICCPR’s guarantee of freedom
from discrimination on the basis of national origin. 99 This section

94. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 26.
95. Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
96. Id. art. 26.
97. Id. art. 2(3).
98. See id. art. 40 (stating that ICCPR State Parties are required to submit
reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to ICCPR rights);
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in
October 2010 – Canada, ¶¶ 7-10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Can/6 (Apr. 9, 2013),
available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.as
px?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fCAN%2f6&Lang=en
(“Canada
wishes
to
emphasize that the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) and the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) have a broad mandate with respect to
discrimination complaints.”); see also Reporting to the Human Rights Committee:
The Canadian Experience, 38 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 261, 283-84 (2000) (providing
an overview of the first four reports submitted by Canada).
99. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 26.
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analyzes the incongruity of Canada’s FATCA with the ICCPR,
specifically: how Canada’s FACTA allows FFIs to discriminate in
violation of ICCPR article 26; Canada’s failure to pass legislation
protecting rights found in article 2 of the ICPPR; and the lack of an
applicable exception under the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (“HRC”)’s discrimination jurisprudence. 100 This section
also analyzes the persuasiveness of the U.S. Model FATCA
Agreement’s anti-discrimination clause to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s interpretation of the U.S.-Canada ITC.

A. BECAUSE CANADA’S FATCA CONSTITUTES FEDERAL LAW, IT
MUST BE CONGRUENT WITH THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN THE
ICCPR.
Intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”), like those the United
States is bilaterally negotiating with foreign countries to implement
FATCA, are the result of voluntary negotiations among federal
governments, and not binding in and of themselves. 101 Only when a
federal law is subsequently passed to implement the IGA does the
law become binding and is thereafter required to comply with other
federal and international law. Thus, although an IGA implementing
FATCA cannot violate international law, a federal law and other
international law implementing FATCA can. 102
On February 4, 2014, Canada signed the U.S.-Canada IGA and
then released federal legislation to implement FATCA as part of
Canada’s budget bill on March 28, 2014, 103 despite widespread

100. See also Whiteley, supra note 24 (arguing that FATCA likely violates
several other international treaties, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the World Trade Organization as well).
101. See Arthur Benz, Multilevel Parliaments in Canada and Europe, 66 INT’L
J. 109, 122 (2010-2011) (“[N]o constitutional provision stipulates obligatory
cooperation.”).
102. See id. (providing a deeper discussion about the sovereignty of the
individual provinces in Canada, stating, “[a]s a rule, intergovernmental agreements
allow individual provinces to opt out if they are not concluded bilaterally between
the federal government and an individual province.” Because the federal law
implements FATCA, all provinces are included).
103. See An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.)
(noting that the enacted Canadian law is substantially similar to the U.S.-Canada
IGA, including its lack of the non-discrimination clause).
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criticism and public opposition. 104 The Canadian law implementing
FATCA became obligated to meet the standards set forth by the
ICCPR once the bilateral IGA between the United States and Canada
resulted in Canadian federal law. 105

B. CANADA’S FATCA VIOLATES ARTICLE 26 OF THE ICCPR,
BECAUSE IT CANNOT “GUARANTEE” U.S PERSONS PROTECTION
FROM DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN
WITHOUT AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury added an anti-discrimination
clause to the U.S. Model specifically because public comments,
reports, and studies revealed the likelihood that FFIs would refuse to
open new financial accounts and maintain existing accounts for
Americans abroad, in order to avoid FATCA’s reach. 106 Canada’s
reason for omitting the anti-discrimination clause from its final
legislation implementing FATCA is unclear; 107 however, Canada is a
104. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 9 (quoting finance executives from
Washington, D.C., Australia, Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Canada, all speaking
out against FATCA); FATCA and the Canada-U.S. Intergovernmental Agreement
(IGA): Information for Clients, CANADIAN BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.cba.ca/
en/consumer-information/40-banking-basics/597-fatca-and-the-canada-usintergovernmental-agreement-iga-information-for-clients (last modified July 2,
2014) [hereinafter FATCA Information for Clients] (“We understand that the U.S.
government is attempting to reduce tax evasion, but we have publicly opposed
FATCA as the wrong way to go about it.”).
105. Benz, supra note 101, at 101.
106. See T.D. 9610, 2013-15 I.R.B. (noting the addition of the antidiscrimination clause in response to public comments received about FATCA).
The U.S. Congress contemplated the discriminatory consequences of FATCA, as
demonstrated by the February 2013 introduction of H.R. Bill 597, the
“Commission on Americans Living Abroad Act.” See Commission on Americans
Living Abroad Act, H.R. 597, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013) (intending to establish a
commission to study how federal laws and policies affect U.S. citizens living in
foreign countries); id. (“Federal policies and requirements that affect the ability of
a United States citizen living in a foreign country to access foreign and domestic
financial institutions, including requirements under chapter 4 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (commonly known as the ‘Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act.’)”).
107. The law implementing Canada’s FATCA provides:
(1) Beginning on or before July 1, 2014, the Financial Institution must have policies
and procedures . . . to prevent the Financial Institution from providing a Financial
Account to any Nonparticipating Financial Institution and to monitor whether the
Financial Institution opens or maintains a Financial Account for any Specified U.S.
Person who is not a resident of Canada . . . .
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country with strong negotiating and bargaining power, 108 and
presumably would choose to apply the law with as little consequence
to Canadian business and economy as possible.
Still, the effects of the omission are clear and the problems
FATCA has caused for U.S. persons in Canada are far-reaching. 109
Since enactment of the law, Americans in Canada (and others
defined as “U.S. persons” under FATCA) have complained that
banks are locking them out, refusing to open new accounts, and that
they are unable to access basic financial services. 110 Some Americans
in Canada have found themselves unable to open retirement planning

(2) Such policies and procedures must provide that if any Financial Account held by a
Specified U.S. Person . . . is identified, the Financial Institution must report such
Financial Account as would be required if the Financial Institution were a Reporting
Canadian Financial Institution . . . or close such Financial Account.

An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament on
February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31, § III(A)(1)-(2)
(Can.) (emphasis added). But see FATCA Information for Clients, supra note 104
(responding to the question, “Do U.S. account holders face discrimination or the
possibility of having their accounts closed?” with “No. The FATCA requirement
that Canadian financial institutions close accounts or refuse to offer services to
U.S. persons in certain circumstances has been eliminated under the IGA.”).
108. See Brown & O’Brien, supra note 77, at 204 (describing Canada as a
wealthy, capital-exporting nation with the ability to diverge from model
agreements).
109. See, e.g., Drew Hasselback, Anti-FATCA Group Hires U.S. Lawyer, FIN.
POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/2014/10/29/anti-fatcagroup-hires-u-s-lawyer/ (discussing renunciation as a means to avoid FATCA
consequences is an increasingly expensive option, since the U.S. Department of
State raised the fee to renounce citizenship from $450 to $2,350); 73% of
Americans Abroad Consider Giving Up Passport Due to FATCA, VALUE WALK
(Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/10/americans-renouncecitizenship-fatca/#comments (“[M]any non-U.S. banks and other financial
institutions will no longer work with Americans which can make living outside the
U.S. achingly complicated.”); Robert W. Wood, Canadians File Suit to Block
FATCA and Prohibit Handover of U.S. Names to IRS, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/12/canadians-file-suit-to-blockfatca-and-prohibit-handover-of-u-s-names/ (reporting on a legal claim filed stating
that FATCA violates equal protection of the law without discrimination).
110. See American Citizens Abroad Comments on FATCA, BLOOMBERG BNA
TAX & ACCOUNTING CTR. (Feb. 8, 2012), available at https://americansabroad.org/
files/6813/4192/6083/acastatementapril2012s.pdf (commenting that “FATCA has
turned Americans abroad into pariahs in the international financial world” and
“[d]ue to FATCA, foreign banks accounts are being closed”). The Annex to the
article contains numerous first-hand reports from U.S. citizens around the world
experiencing discrimination.
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and investment opportunities, access job and rental opportunities,
utilize tax planning services, or seek other tax advantages available
to Canadians. 111 Indeed, NPR reported in early 2014 that as a result
of the law, foreign banks have “decided to wash their hands of
American account-holders. . . . Congress wanted to catch tax cheats.
But the net also snagged Americans whose foreign bank accounts let
them pay their bills in the countries they now call home.” 112 Without
an anti-discrimination clause—or at least some form of antidiscriminatory protection—in the law, Canada cannot uphold its duty
to “guarantee” all persons protection from impermissible
discrimination, as required by ICCPR article 26.
1. Burdensome Costs of Implementing FATCA in Canada
Incentivizes and Permits Discrimination Rather than Guarding
Against it.
Complying with FATCA has not been an insignificant undertaking
for foreign governments and financial institutions. In Canada, where
the population of American citizens is approximately one million—
the highest population of Americans outside of the United States 113—
the law’s effects are particularly consequential. FATCA has cost
Canadian banks approximately $750 million Canadian dollars in due
diligence and preparation expenses as of July 2014. 114 Rough
estimates show that average compliance cost is approximately five to
ten million dollars per financial institution, or an aggregate total of
one to two trillion dollars. 115 Despite the law’s intention to reduce
111. See, e.g., Cain, Dual Citizens, supra note 62 (complaining of Canadian
Charter violations).
112. Shapiro, supra note 1.
113. See Rita Trichur, U.S. Expats Sue Over Canadian Deal to Tell Washington
About Their Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
expats-in-canada-sue-over-u-s-effort-to-collect-taxes-abroad-1407856738
[hereinafter Trichur, U.S. Expats].
114. Rita Trichur, Canada Banks Tally Their Tax-Compliance Tab, WALL ST. J.
(July 27, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/canada-banks-tally-their-taxcompliance-tab-1406504252 [hereinafter Trichur, Canada Banks].
115. See Peter R. Altenburger et al., FATCA: U.S. Legislation with Broad
Consequences for Many, SWISS-AM. CHAMBER COM. (Sept. 11, 2010),
http://www.amcham.ch/members_interests/p_business_ch.asp?s=7&c=
(noting
that the expense is recognized to be greater than its immediate returns); see also
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE
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legal impediments of compliance, 116 these costs are cripplingly and
preventatively high for many institutions. 117
As a result, it is unsurprising that some FFIs, especially small,
provincial banks who typically only serve a limited number of
clients, simply cannot afford to maintain U.S. persons as customers
under the new law. To address this, Canada’s FATCA specifically
considers such institutions (termed “local banks”) to be “deemedcompliant.” 118 This means that those banks that have less than fifty
million dollars in assets on their balance sheets, are not-for-profit
(e.g., certain credit unions and co-ops) and as long as they do not
target U.S. clientele (among other requirements), they do not have to
implement procedures to comply with the law. 119
Therefore, it is only the larger, for profit, nonexempt Canadian
financial institutions that are caught in FATCA’s web—the same
institutions that would most likely be expected to uphold antidiscriminatory policies and practices. Without an anti-discrimination
clause in the agreement, they are seemingly permitted to make the
choice: serve U.S. customers (and pay to comply with the law) or
refuse them (and avoid the implementation costs). 120 So long as the
cost of managing American business under FATCA exceeds the cost
of losing American business altogether, these institutions have an
economic incentive to choose the latter.

AMENDMENT TO THE HOUSE AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R.
2847, THE “HIRING INCENTIVES TO RESTORE EMPLOYMENT ACT” 6-10 (2010)
(providing estimated numbers for 2010 through 2020); Trichur, Canada Banks,
supra note 114 (stating that the Treasury anticipates $729 million in annual
revenue from the law).
116. T.D. 9610, 2013-15 I.R.B. 768.
117. See Behrens, supra note 42, at 217 (“The high cost of compliance . . .
simply outweighs the benefits of FATCA.”).
118. See An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31, §
III(A)-(C) (Can.).
119. Id. § III(C)(3).
120. See, e.g., The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), DLA PIPER
LLP 3, http://files.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/FATCA-Alert.pdf
(“Many FFIs no longer are accepting US accountholders or making it very
expensive for a US holder to open an account.”) (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); Why
FATCA is Bad for America-Update, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, https://americans
abroad.org/issues/fatca/fatca-bad-america/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2014) (“Because
of [FATCA], some foreign banks have refused to do business with Americans.”).
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To the extent that Canadian financial institutions have refused to
deal with U.S. accountholders, it is likely because FATCA’s
burdensome costs incentivize such discrimination. 121 Thus, because
Canada removed the only provision that would have safeguarded
Americans from this discriminatory treatment, with no other
safeguard employed to replace it, Canada’s FATCA does not meet
the bar of guaranteeing effective protection of U.S. persons from
discrimination on the basis of their national origin, as required by
article 26 of the ICCPR. 122

C. CANADA’S FAILURE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE RIGHTS
PROTECTED BY THE ICCPR THROUGH ADEQUATE LEGISLATION
ALSO VIOLATES ICCPR ARTICLE 2.
Canada’s decision not to enact an anti-discrimination clause would
not run afoul of ICCPR article 2 if other existing legislation already
provided similar protection. 123 In Canada, there are at least three
existing laws that appear to provide anti-discriminatory protections:
(1) the U.S.-Canada ITC’s preexisting “Nondiscrimination
Article” 124; (2) the Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations,
which prohibit Canadian banks from requiring identification more
than those enumerated in the law; 125 and (3) the Canadian Charter,
which prevents discrimination on the basis of, among other protected
classes, national origin. 126 However, none of these laws provide

121. See, e.g., Scott D. Michel & H. David Rosenbloom, FATCA and Foreign
Bank Accounts: Has the U.S. Overreached?, VIEWPOINTS, May 30, 2011, at 709
(“[I]t is becoming more and more apparent that in the well-intentioned effort to
find tax cheats hiding money overseas, the U.S. government has not only
overplayed its hand, but has enacted an extensive and expensive new regulatory
scheme that defies common sense.”).
122. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 26.
123. Article 2(2) of the ICCPR states:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.

Id. art. 2(2).
124. See Income Tax Convention, supra note 14, art. 8.
125. Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.).
126. Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15.
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unambiguous protection for U.S. persons who will be unable to open
and maintain financial accounts as a result of FATCA.
First, the U.S.-Canada ITC contains a “Nondiscrimination
Article.” 127 The article protects individuals in each treaty country
specifically from discriminatory taxation, i.e., tax laws in either
country that would result in double taxation of the same income. 128
The article provides that in Canada, U.S. nationals must not be
subjected to “more burdensome” taxation than similarly situated
Canadian nationals. 129 Likewise, the remaining provisions of the
article specify that certain classes of individuals (such as married
persons), entities, and payments (such as the deductibility of certain
types of expenses) shall not be subjected to discriminatory
taxation. 130
However, this Nondiscrimination Article has no relation to the
kind of discrimination at hand. 131 It does not provide protection in the
case of opening and maintaining financial accounts, as the U.S.
Model anti-discrimination clause attempts to provide, 132 and as a
result, U.S. persons in Canada are not protected from discrimination
under this article.
Second, Canadian laws that seemingly give effect to the ICCPR’s
protection from discrimination include the Access to Basic Banking
127. Income Tax Convention, supra note 14, art. XXV.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES: WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 36
(1998) (“Non-discrimination Articles which are based on the OECD Model
Conventions furthermore contain specific provisions relating to non-discriminatory
taxation in respect of permanent establishments, to deductibility of certain
payments, including royalty and interest payments.”); see also Manal Corwin,
Treasury Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Opening Statement at the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/Documents/OTPTest-2011-6-7-Corwin-SenFR.pdf (discussing
the non-discrimination article as preventing discriminatory taxation only in the
context of the application of the tax code).
132. See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International Tax Regime As a
Commitment Projector, 33 VA. TAX R. 59, 105 (2013) (“The fact that FATCA . . .
focus[es] on reporting and penalties for nonreporting (instead of new tax
measures), however, may mean that the tax treaty, which only covers taxation
measures, will not offer relief to U.S. persons living in Canada.”).
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Services Regulations. 133 The ABBS provides some indirect
protection to U.S. persons, along with other nonresidents living in
Canada, from financial institutions turning them away by limiting the
type of identification that banks can require to open an account. 134
U.S.-identifying information is not included within the list of
identification sources; therefore, a bank would seemingly be unable
to require it in order to open an account.
However, in this respect, the ABBS directly conflicts with
FATCA’s requirement that all financial institutions request and
receive documentation that will confirm whether each accountholder
is a “U.S. Reportable Account.” 135 Although the ABBS may continue
to be applicable for non-U.S. accountholders, such as nonresidents
living in Canada, it will not provide protection to U.S. persons under
FATCA, because the law implementing FATCA will override the
ABBS. 136
Finally, the Canadian Charter, passed in 1982, contains an equal
protection clause that protects individuals from discrimination by the
government. 137 Consistent with the ICCPR, the Charter specifically
guarantees protection from discrimination on the basis of national
origin. 138
133. See Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.)
(limiting ID requirements to a Canadian drivers’ license, Canadian passport, or
Canadian certificate of citizenship, and other Canadian documents.). The exclusive
list does not include proof regarding U.S. citizenship or residency.
134. Id.
135. An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31, art.
4(1)(a) (Can.).
136. In fact, a primary reason for federal passage of the U.S.-Canada IGA was
to respond to concerns that direct implementation of FATCA by Canadian
financial institutions would conflict with local laws that prohibit banks from
collecting and disclosing such information.
137. See Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15 (“Every individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.”); see, e.g., Cain, Dual Citizens, supra note 62 (alleging
violations of civil rights under article 15 of Canadian Charter).
138. See Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15 (“Every individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law . . . without discrimination based on . . . national or ethnic
origin”).
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However, the law’s passage does not necessarily give rise to the
protections under the law. The ICCPR draws this distinction in
article 2 by stating Canada must also “take the necessary steps . . . to
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
to the rights.” 139 The ABBS is an example of a law that Canada
adopted to give effect to the rights protected by the Charter (albeit
not the rights Americans need protected as a result of FATCA). 140
Simply passing the Charter does not solve the problem; it is
incumbent upon Canadian lawmakers to pass specific legislation that
carries out the guarantees of the Charter.
Including the anti-discrimination clause of the U.S. Model, at a
minimum, would help give effect to the rights protected by the
Charter and the ICCPR. Canada’s FATCA, absent the antidiscrimination clause, has not given effect to the rights that all
individuals in Canada should enjoy. Consequently, the existing
legislation in Canada violates article 2 of the ICCPR.
1. Omitting the Anti-Discrimination Clause Does Not Further
FATCA’s Stated Purpose; Therefore, an Exception to the ICCPR
Does Not Apply.
In international law jurisprudence, just as in domestic U.S. law,
discrimination is permitted to a certain extent and in certain
circumstances. 141 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a law that
discriminates (or impedes a fundamental right) must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 142 Similarly, in
139. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2(2).
140. Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.).
141. Holy Monasteries v. Greece, App. 13092/87, ¶ 92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 9,
1994). (“It is important to note that the right to non-discrimination does not
prohibit all differences in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms.”).
See also Andrejeva v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00, ¶ 81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18,
2009); see, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Derksen v. Netherlands, Commc’n No.
976/2001, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001 (2004); Human Rights
Comm., Müller v. Namibia, Commc’n No. 919/2000, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/74/D/919/2000 (1999); Human Rights Comm., Pauger v. Austria,
Commc’n No. 716/1996, ¶ 7.3 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996 (1999); Human
Rights Comm., Broeks v. Netherlands, Commc’n No. 172/1984, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990); Human Rights Comm., Vos v. Netherlands, Commc’n No.
218/1986, ¶ 11.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986 (1989); see also Andrejeva
v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00, ¶ 81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 2009).
142. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parents’
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cases before the HRC, which reviews international human rights
violations under the ICCPR, the HRC emphasizes a parallel
standard. 143
For example, in Fedotova v. Russian Fed’n, 144 the Russian
government convicted the plaintiff, a gay rights activist, of violating
an ordinance prohibiting public actions aimed at “the propaganda of
[homosexuality] among minors.” 145 In review of the legal argument,
the HRC reminded the international community of its jurisprudence
that “not every differentiation based on the grounds listed in article
26 of the [ICCPR] amounts to discrimination, as long as it is based
on reasonable and objective criteria, in pursuit of an aim that is
legitimate.” 146 The HRC noted that in this instance, although the
Russian law pursued a legitimate state interest—the protection of
public morals, health, rights and interests of minors—it was not
based on reasonable and objective criteria; the law only prosecuted
propaganda of homosexuality, as opposed to propaganda of both
heterosexuality and homosexuality. 147 The HRC found this
distinction unjustifiable, concluded that Russia violated the

fundamental right to freedom of religion outweighed the state’s interest in
educating children); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the First
Amendment of the Constitution required the government to demonstrate a
compelling interest before denying unemployment compensation); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that laws permitting the compulsory
sterilization of criminals are unconstitutional if the sterilization law treats similar
crimes differently).
143. See ICCPR, supra note 17. In accordance with the ICCPR Protocol, the
HRC reviews claims of alleged ICCPR violations and issues reports of its findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
144. Human Rights Comm., Fedotova v. Russian Fed., Commc’n No.
1932/2010, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (2012).
145. Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 10.6. The plaintiff argued to the HRC that the bar on
“propaganda” violated her right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation under article 26 of the ICCPR when she was victimized for
holding posters that declared “I am proud of my homosexuality” and
“Homosexuality is normal” during a peaceful gay pride assembly in Moscow. Id.
¶¶ 2.2, 3.4.
146. Id. ¶ 10.6.
147. See id. (noting that there was no evidence that allowed for making a
distinction between heterosexual and homosexual propaganda).
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plaintiff’s article 26 rights, and compelled Russia to make the
relevant provisions of the law compatible with the ICCPR. 148
In Canada, the stated legitimate objective of the U.S.-Canada ITC
implementing FATCA is to prevent “evasion with respect to taxes on
income and on capital,” including through the exchange of tax
information. 149 The omission of an anti-discrimination clause that
would prevent financial institutions from employing “policies or
practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining Financial
Accounts” 150 for U.S. persons is inapposite to the government
purpose for the law. The government interest of preventing tax
evasion and promoting the exchange of tax information cannot be
served when its target tax citizens—U.S. persons abroad—are
prevented from opening and maintaining accounts abroad.
Like the Russian ordinance that only targeted homosexual
propaganda among minors as opposed to all sexual propaganda
among minors, the omission of the anti-discrimination clause from
Canada’s FATCA only permits closing of accounts held by U.S.
persons, as opposed to an objective criterion, such as permitting the
closing of accounts held by all noncompliant accountholders (which
is already a FATCA requirement). 151 Therefore, omission of the U.S.
Model anti-discrimination clause is not rationally related to, or in
furtherance of, FATCA’s stated purpose of preventing tax evasion.
The HRC would hold that Canada must enact legislation prohibiting
discriminatory treatment by banks or provide some other rational
reason why this government sanctioned imposition of a fundamental
right should be permissible under the ICCPR.

D. THE VIENNA CONVENTION INSTRUCTS THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA TO VIEW THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE OF THE
U.S. MODEL FATCA AS PERSUASIVE.
A strong body of recent Canadian case law concludes that tax
treaty interpretation includes not only language of the relevant tax
148. See id. ¶¶ 10.7-12.
149. See Income Tax Convention, supra note 14, art. 30 (providing an
alternative means of meeting the U.S. objectives under FATCA—by relying on
existing provisions for information exchange under the Canada-U.S. ITC).
150. Annex II, supra note 11, at 6.
151. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(f)(2) (2010) (requiring the closure of any
noncompliant accounts without a waiver).
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treaty, but extrinsic materials that aid the interpretation of the treaty
as well. 152 In Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. v. Canada, 153 the Supreme
Court of Canada stated that the ITC between Canada and the United
States was based on the OECD Model Convention and held that the
OECD Model of 1977 and OECD Commentaries had “high
persuasive value” in interpreting the definition of the word “resident”
in the treaty. 154 Particularly illustrative of this rule, in TD Sec. (USA)
LLC the Tax Court of Canada held that OECD documents could be
used as extrinsic aids to interpret a tax treaty. 155 In that case, the court
found that a key instrument of the Canada-U.S. ITC at issue was the
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Technical Explanation, which the
Canadian government recognized as an accurate reflection of
understandings reached in the course of negotiations regarding the
interpretation and application of the treaty. 156 The Tax Court
explained that the U.S. Treasury Technical Explanation provides a
“workable” solution consistent with the purpose and context of the
Treaty. 157
Because the Vienna Convention calls for the interpretation of
treaties to include not only the text of treaties but also the context of
the treaty, the Supreme Court of Canada may give official Model
Agreements, such as the U.S. Model FATCA Agreement, high
persuasive value if the Court analyzes the intention of the U.S.Canada ITC implementing FATCA.
In addition, some tax treaties are explicitly required to meet the
obligations of human rights conventions. The United Kingdom, for
example, passed the Human Rights Act of 1988, which required that
152. Accord Am. Income Life Ins. Co. v. R, [2008] D.T.C. 3631 (Can.) (finding
that the OECD Model and U.N. Models aided interpretation of the U.S.-Canada
ITC and drew the inference that the absence of an “insurance clause” from the
OECD Model and Canada’s treaty with the United States indicated that the drafters
of the treaty intended not to include the U.N. Model’s insurance clause).
153. [1995] S.C.R. 802 (Can).
154. Id. at 803.
155. See id. at 815; see also Knights of Columbus v. R., [2008] T.C.C. 307
(Can.).
156. But see TONNY SCHENK-GEERS, INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION AND THE PROTECTION OF TAXPAYERS 36 (2009) (“Parliamentary
documents in the individual states, such as Explanatory Memoranda, going with
the concept treaties in the ratification process, do not form part of the context in the
sense of the Vienna Convention.”).
157. TD Sec. (USA) LLC, 5 C.T.C. at 12.
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all U.K. legislation be read and given effect in a way that is
compatible with other U.K. law, including compliance with the
European Convention on Human Rights of 1951. 158 Commentators
have stated that this would increasingly impact issues related to the
exchange of information and certain provisions of tax treaties. 159
Here, if a civil suit alleging discrimination under the U.S.-Canada
ITC implementing FATCA reaches the Supreme Court of Canada,
the Court should view the U.S. Model FATCA Agreement as a
persuasive document revealing some valuable context of the treaty.
The U.S. Model’s inclusion of an anti-discrimination clause shows
the United States intends that FATCA be implemented with attached
anti-discrimination protection for U.S. persons abroad. Although not
binding, and perhaps only as persuasive as the ultimate decision
between the treaty negotiators to omit the clause, the inclusion of the
protection shows that negotiators contemplated the harm caused to
U.S. persons seeking to maintain or open financial accounts in
Canada and should be addressed in one form or another.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The ability for a U.S. taxpayer abroad to avoid a tax obligation
through misinformation, improper filing, or nondisclosure of foreignheld assets and income has created the need for more aggressive U.S.
tax collection efforts. 160 However, this need should not supersede an
individual’s right to access basic banking and financial services.
While it is clear that Canada was not agreeable to passing
FATCA, 161 and would want to limit the obligations created for
Canadian financial institutions, this does not excuse leaving open to
interpretation whether Canadian financial institutions can institute
policies and practices that discriminate against U.S. persons in
Canada. Canadian and U.S. lawmakers who negotiated the final
agreement implementing FATCA in Canada may reveal that the
omission of the anti-discrimination clause was not intended to permit
158. SCHWARZ, supra note 78, at 128.
159. Id. (citing to Percival v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue &
Customs, [2013] UKFTT 240 (TC) as an example of an attempt to “impugn the
terms of a treaty by operation of the European Convention on Human Rights”).
160. See discussion infra Part II(A) (discussing the problems with voluntary
compliance for U.S. persons abroad).
161. See discussion infra Part II(B)(1).
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such discriminatory behavior; that, rather, the lawmakers only
intended to permit Canadian financial institutions—a private
marketplace—to choose who its clientele should be, based on the
expensive due diligence demands that are attached to FATCA. If a
bank cannot “afford” U.S. customers because of FATCA, then
perhaps the bank should not be required to take on the customer.
However, when Canadian lawmakers chose to pass FATCA, and
recognized that discrimination was inevitable, the legislators should
have employed other remedies (whether legislative, administrative,
or judicial) to counteract foreseeable unlawful discrimination. Some
feasible remedies include enacting the U.S. Model’s antidiscrimination clause, demanding that the United States subsidize the
cost of implementing FATCA, or reducing the cost of U.S.
expatriation.

A. CANADA’S FATCA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS.
One of three solutions to alleviate the discrimination U.S. persons
abroad face is to amend the Canadian law implementing FATCA
under the U.S.-Canada ITC to include the anti-discrimination clause
of the U.S. Model FATCA Agreement or a substantially similar antidiscrimination clause. 162 If Canada adopted the U.S. Model’s clause,
the clause would state: “The Financial Institution must not have
policies or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining
Financial Accounts for individuals who are Specified U.S. Persons
and residents of [Canada].” 163
The anti-discrimination clause would provide compliant U.S.
citizens in Canada with unambiguous protection from
discrimination. 164 Although the clause may not stop all, or even most,
instances of discrimination in practice, 165 at least those who
experience account closings or refusals, despite being compliant with
FATCA requirements, would have a source of recourse under the
162. See Annex II, supra note 11, at 6.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See, e.g., Michel & Rosenbloom, supra note 121 (recounting stories of
American citizens who have been shut out by their foreign banks in Switzerland
and Germany, despite the presence of an anti-discrimination clause in these
FATCA agreements).
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U.S.-Canada ITC.

B. THE COST OF FATCA SHOULD BE SUBSIDIZED BY THE UNITED
STATES, OR THE COST OF U.S. EXPATRIATION REDUCED.
It is clear that the cause of the discriminatory treatment is not U.S.
citizenship alone, but the exceedingly high cost of FATCA
compliance, which is attached to U.S. citizenship. 166 Therefore,
another option is for the United States to subsidize the cost of
FATCA implementation in Canada. Given that FATCA originated in
the United States, the United States should consider subsidizing the
cost for this American-made imposition. If the expensive burden is
somewhat alleviated through a subsidy, banks would not be forced to
turn away U.S. customers.
In the alternative, if FATCA’s due diligence and compliance costs
are not subsidized, and U.S. persons abroad continue to face
discrimination, then the cost of expatriating should be made more
affordable. Recently, the cost of expatriation in Canada rose from
$450 to $2,350 (U.S. dollars). 167 This cost is prohibitively expensive
for some. 168 In addition, the current wait to expatriate from the
United States in Canada can take over a year. 169 Although the
solution of relinquishing U.S. citizenship mischaracterizes the
problem (a U.S. citizen should not have to change who he or she is in
order to avoid unlawful discrimination), if a U.S. citizen decides to
expatriate, it should be more affordable to do so. 170 Of course,
relinquishing citizenship may not end the discrimination altogether,
166. See Trichur, U.S. Expats, supra note 113 (claiming the implementation of
FATCA costs Canadian banks a total of $750 million dollars).
167. See Patrick Cain, Meet the Alberta Man Who Went to Tijuana to Renounce
His U.S. Citizenship, GLOBAL NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://globalnews.ca/news/
1671945/meet-the-alberta-man-who-went-to-tijuana-to-renounce-his-u-scitizenship/ [hereinafter Cain, Meet the Alberta Man] (stating the fee increase took
effect on September 12, 2014).
168. See id. (noting that a man traveled from Canada to Mexico to renounce his
citizenship and saved $1,800 doing so).
169. Id.
170. See Helena Bachmann, Mister Taxman: Why Some Americans Working
Abroad Are Ditching Their Citizenships, T IME (Jan. 31, 2013), http://world.
time.com/2013/01/31/mister-taxman-why-some-americans-working-abroad-areditching-their-citizenships (commenting that famous singer-performer Tina
Turner’s renunciation of U.S. citizenship is likely the result of discriminatory
treatment).
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especially if there are still U.S. indicators present in an individual’s
account, such as a U.S. address or spouse who is a U.S. citizen or
resident. 171

C. THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE SHOULD FIND THAT
CANADA’S FATCA VIOLATES THE ICCPR.
Finally, without a legislative or administrative remedy available,
another remedy for victims of discrimination is through the court
system. Victims can file a complaint to the HRC alleging a violation
of their civil rights as guaranteed under the ICCPR articles 2(2) and
26. 172 To be actionable under the ICCPR, plaintiffs must exhaust all
administrative remedies available in Canada, which includes first
filing a complaint in Canadian courts alleging violation of the
Canadian Charter. 173
In at least one instance, the argument that the Canadian law
implementing FATCA violates the Canadian Charter’s equal
protection clause has been put forward in a civil complaint. 174 On
August 11, 2014, two Canadians with dual citizenship in the U.S.
and Canada sued the Canadian federal government for signing the
Canadian law implementing FATCA. 175 The plaintiffs are two
professional Ontario women who were born in the United States, but
have lived in Canada since they were five and have never worked in
the United States or filed U.S. tax returns. 176 In their complaint, they
allege that the collection and disclosure of their personal information
to the U.S. government violates basic principles and civil rights
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, including the right to “the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination . . .
based on race, national or ethnic origin.” 177 The treatment and
outcome of this complaint will reveal whether filing a civil suit
171. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. (including as reportable under
the law U.S. citizens, individuals with a joint accountholder with U.S. indicators,
individuals with a U.S. residence address or a U.S. correspondence address, and
individuals with a power of attorney or signatory authority granted to a person with
a U.S. address).
172. See ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 2, 26.
173. See id.
174. See Cain, Meet the Alberta Man, supra note 167.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15(1).
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exhausts all administrative actions.
Because the ICCPR guarantees protection against discrimination
“on any ground such as . . . national or social origin, . . . birth or
other status,” 178 the HRC will likely find that the absence of an antidiscrimination clause from the U.S.-Canada ITC, and the subsequent
discrimination based on national origin caused by the law, violates
the civil rights protected by the ICCPR. In the face of such disparate
treatment of U.S. citizens in Canada, the HRC should require Canada
to actively take measures to guarantee the civil protection and
nondiscriminatory treatment of individuals within its jurisdiction.

V. CONCLUSION
Canada has the highest number of U.S. citizens living in its
jurisdiction outside of the United States. In Canada more than
anywhere else, an anti-discrimination clause is necessary to protect
U.S. persons who are vulnerable to discrimination under FATCA.
Despite the presence of applicable laws that provide general
protections against discrimination, the lack of an anti-discrimination
clause in Canada’s FATCA agreement creates ambiguity as to how
financial institutions are permitted to treat U.S. persons under the
law.
Although an anti-discrimination provision would impose
FATCA’s costly compliance expenses on Canadian financial
institutions, the solution is not to simply circumvent FATCA. If a
country is going to pass FATCA into law, the law should properly
place the burden of the legislation in the right place. The burden
belongs not with the compliant U.S. persons living abroad who have
a fundamental right to be free from discrimination, but with the
government that believes easy access to information will help find
noncompliant taxpayers. Even in the context of international tax
compliance and tax treaties, it is necessary that human rights,
including the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
one’s national origin, be properly balanced with the needs of a
growing, complex economy.

178. ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 2, 26.

